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I. Introduction 
 
In 2008, Maine entered a new chapter in its organization of the county jail system. 
In essence, the state agreed to freeze the local property tax, and assume responsibility for 
financing any additional operational and some capital costs out of the General Fund, in 
consideration for the counties submitting to the oversight of a newly created Board of 
Corrections which would approve budgets, set goals, and champion economies of scale. 
 
Now, five years later, the new system has displayed such serious shortcomings that the 
Legislature has initiated a special study of what’s working and what’s not, and directed this 
Commission to make recommendations for further reform by December 4, 2013. The following 
report and draft legislation is provided in fulfillment of that mandate.  
 
II. Executive Summary  
 
The Board of Corrections and the Unified County Corrections System were created by the 
Legislature in response to growing demands for inmate beds, proposed major capital spending 
to meet the need and concerns about the efficiency of the autonomous county system and the 
burden on local property taxpayers. 
 
The Legislature adopted a hybrid solution to these challenges, “Capping county taxes in 
exchange for making unused space available to house inmates from elsewhere in the system,”1 
under the oversight of both the DOC and a new entity, the BOC. The BOC was invested with a 
mandate to promote efficiency, reduce recidivism and several other goals. But it was not 
equipped with sufficient authority or means to achieve those goals. 
Recognizing the need for change, the 126th Legislature created a Commission to study the 
system and report back in advance of the second session. 
The Commission identified 10 major problems: 
1. An unrealistic funding process; 
2. Lack of authority for the BOC 
3. Too much time spent by the BOC on budget approval; 
4. Goals and objectives neither defined nor met; 
5. No jail standardization; 
6. Innovative and high quality programs and incentives sacrificed; 
7. Too many jails “not obeying the rules”; 
8. The current funding crisis; 
9. Excessive pre-trial populations, coordination with the judicial system; and 
                                                
1 “Fund Report - Maine State Board of Corrections” RHR Smith & Co, CPAs, Accounting & Consulting 
Services Contract #CT95E20125-3230, June 11, 2012, pg. 9. 
Hereafter cited as “Smith.” 
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10. Mental health needs inadequately addressed. 
 
It then analyzed the root causes that contributed to the creation of these problems, namely: 
1. Lack of a vision that the jails are part of a statewide criminal justice system which should 
be for the common benefit and protection, and the fair distribution of the common 
burden, of all the people of Maine; 
2. Lack of ownership of the hybrid organization by the Legislature and Administration; 
3. Lack of incentives and disincentives for system collaboration among the counties; 
4. Incomplete executive leadership; 
5. Lack of common accounting standards; 
6. Lack of will and authority of the BOC to make and enforce critical decision; and, 
7. Lack of a mechanism for systematic planning and funding capital expenses. 
 
The Commission then considered four basic structural models for getting at the problems 
identified and their causes. 
 
Briefly, those models were: 
1. A return to autonomous county management and incremental property tax funding for 
future budget increases; 
2. Creation of a new regional jail authority model with groups of 4 counties each following 
the Two Bridges Regional Jail Authority model; 
3. A complete state take-over; and 
4. Modification of the current BOC model, to give the Board real authority over budgets, 
contracts, standards and new construction. 
 
Though each model had some appeal, the Commission settled on the modification of the 
current BOC as the most practical. Based on these conclusions, the Commission recommends 
the following changes to the current statute: 
1. Vision: 
Revise 34-A MRSA § 1801(2) to expressly state the BOC is empowered to adopt and 
require compliance with procedures, policies and regulations to promote statewide 
actions to plan, finance and execute a unified county correctional system.  
2. BOC Representation: 
By a majority vote, to retain the current membership composition of the BOC. 
3. Provide enforcement incentives to assure compliance with BOC policies: 
Amend 34-A § 1803 by adding a new subsection (12) to give the BOC explicit authority 
to: 
a. Provide discretionary funding for innovative projects; 
b. In the event  a county does not comply with a lawful directive of the BOC, 
withhold funds otherwise allocated to that county until, in the judgment of the 
BOC, it comes into compliance; and 
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c. In the event of a major breach in its directives, recommend to the DOC that it 
assume direct control of a facility pursuant to 34-A § 3009, in which case the 
county would be responsible for the costs incurred by the DOC. 
4. Executive Leadership: 
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803-A to make explicit the duties and expectations for managing 
the business of the BOC by the Executive Director and the Financial Analyst, freeing the 
Board members to concentrate on issues of broad policy. 
5. Common Accounting Standards: 
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(E) to give the BOC authority to establish common 
accounting standards consistent with State procedure concerning corrections related 
county budgets and to establish and enforce standard performance matrix and reporting 
formats for operational and capital investment issues as well.  Rename the “Investment 
Fund” the “State Operations Support Fund” to clear up confusion regarding the use of 
these amounts. 
6. BOC Authority: 
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803 to confer greater authority or the BOC to: 
a. set standards 
b. enter into contracts 
c. offer back office services 
d. assign inmates 
e. encourage regional cooperation 
f. monitor performance, and 
g. collect and distribute funds, in order to promote economies of scale, efficiencies 
in operations, orderly expenditures of available funds and other related purposes.  
7. Capital Investment: 
Amend 34-A MRSA 1803(4) to provide that the BOC shall affirmatively establish a 
program for requiring 10 year major capital improvement plans from each of the 
counties, and prioritize projects for funding.   These projects would then be funded by 
the creation of a transitional legislative provision to fund “Inverse Debt” in an amount 
equal to 10% per year of the estimated total CIP cost over the upcoming 10 year period 
for all capital projects of more than $250,000.  This new fund could then be called the 
“Major Capital Projects Sinking Fund” 
 
For major capital needs, funding should be underwritten by a combination of State 
Appropriations and county bond issues in a way that ensures no county is required to 
make a property tax effort greater than the average for all counties. For projects of less 
than $100,000 the county should be able to call upon its own reserves, and 30-A MRSA 
§ 924(2) should be amended to allow fund balances to be maintained by the county 
based on 20% of corrections expenditures, as recommended by RHR Smith.2  
  
It is the view of the Commission that county surplus funds should be available for use in 
a capital improvement program and placed in a capital improvement fund for a program 
                                                
2 Smith, p 15 
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approved by the BOC. Surplus funds may also be dedicated to a county’s unfunded 
liability to the amount identified in the county budget, with the approval of the BOC.            
8. Supplementary Legislation: 
In addition to the foregoing measures to address the root causes of the BOC’s problems, 
the Commission further recommends changes to achieve the goals of the BOC 
Legislation as follows: 
a. Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803(3)(A) to improve pretrial management of cases by 
i. mandating pretrial diversion and bail services statewide; 
ii. developing and utilizing a standard minimum risk questionnaire to 
facilitate the use of bail in appropriate cases; and 
iii. mandatory provision of video links with reliable interconnections in each 
jail for use for arraignments and other appropropriate proceedings and 
trading usage by judges and DAs of such facilities. 
9. It now appears that the budget is likely to be approximately $2.8 million short for FY 
2014 given certain assumptions. This Legislation should address that shortfall and 
ensure a realistic amount for FY 20153 and begin funding the sinking fund for future 
capital consideration by a supplemental appropriation bill for consideration at the 2nd 
session of the 126th Legislature. 
  
III. Mandate of the Commission 
 
The 126th Legislature enacted the creation of a Joint Study Order Establishing a Commission to 
Study the State Board of Corrections and the Unified County Corrections System by LR 2171, 
which reads as follows: 
 
126th Maine Legislature, LR 2171 
Joint Study Order Establishing the Commission To Study the State Board of Corrections and the 
Unified County Corrections System 
ORDERED, the Senate concurring, that, notwithstanding Joint Rule 353, the Blue 
Ribbon Commission To Study the State Board of Corrections and the Unified County 
Corrections System, referred to in this order as "the commission," is established as 
follows: 
1. Membership. The commission consists of the following members: 
A. Three county commissioners, one of whom is appointed by the President of the 
Senate and 2 of whom are appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
from a list of 5 county commissioners submitted by the Maine County Commissioners 
Association; 
B. Three county administrators, 2 of whom are appointed by the President of the 
Senate and one of whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
from a list of 5 county administrators submitted by the Maine Association of County 
Administrators and Managers; 
C. Two jail administrators, one of whom is appointed by the President of the Senate 
                                                
3 See Appendix K 
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and one of whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from a 
list of 4 jail administrators submitted by the Maine Jail Administrators Association; 
D. Two sheriffs, one of whom is appointed by the President of the Senate and one of 
whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from a list of 4 
sheriffs submitted by the Maine Sheriffs Association; and 
E. A member of the public, appointed jointly by the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall 
invite the Commissioner of Corrections, or the commissioner's designee, and the chair 
of the State Board of Corrections to participate as members. 
2. Chair. The public member appointed pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph F serves 
as chair of the commission. 
3. Appointments; convening. All appointments must be made no later than 30 days 
following the passage of this order. The appointing authorities shall notify the 
Executive Director of the Legislative Council once all appointments have been 
completed. When the appointment of all members has been completed, the chair shall 
call and convene the first meeting of the commission. If 30 days or more after passage 
of this order a majority of but not all appointments have been made, the chair may 
request authority and the Legislative Council may grant authority for the commission 
to meet and conduct its business. 
4. Duties. The commission shall: 
A. Review the current structure of the county jail corrections system, including but 
not limited to its source of revenues, the predictability of costs and revenues and 
strengths and weaknesses of the current system, in order to determine methods for 
long-term sustainability of funding, best practices and necessary processes; 
B. Review and propose revisions, if necessary, to the mission and authority of the 
State Board of Corrections; and 
C. Clarify the structure and authority of the unified system of corrections and the State Board of 
Corrections and develop recommendations to strengthen centralization of the system and 
control and coordination of operations. 
5. Staff assistance. The Legislative Council may seek the provision of staffing 
services from a non-legislative entity, including the Maine County Commissioners 
Association. The Legislative Council may not incur any costs for staffing services 
provided pursuant to this subsection. 
6. Outside funding. The commission shall seek funding contributions to fully fund 
the costs of the study. All funding is subject to approval by the Legislative Council in 
accordance with its policies. If sufficient contributions to fund the study have not been 
received within 30 days after the passage of this order, no meetings are authorized and 
no expenses of any kind may be incurred or reimbursed. 
7. Report. No later than December 4, 2013, the commission shall submit a report that 
includes its findings and recommendations, including suggested legislation, to the 
Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety. 
 
 
 8 
IV. Commission Membership 
 
After extensive consultation, 15 members were appointed to the Commission by the Speaker, 
Mark Eves, and the Senate President, Justin Alfond. The public member, David Flanagan, a 
retired executive and attorney, served as chair. The commission has been staffed by Bill 
Whitten, Deputy County Manager, Elizabeth Trice, Grants & Special Projects Coordinator, and 
Amy Fickett, Public Relations Coordinator, all loaned from Cumberland County.  
 
David Flanagan Chair  Public Member 
Capt. Marsha 
Alexander Jail Administrator Kennebec County 
Bob Devlin County Manager Kennebec County 
John Lebel Jail Administrator Androscoggin County 
Greg Zinser County Manager York County 
James Cloutier County Commissioner Cumberland County 
Joel Merry Sheriff Sagadahoc County, Sheriff’s Assn. 
Joseph Ponte DOC Commissioner Department of Corrections 
Lawrence (Max) 
Dawson County Commissioner Sagadahoc County 
Mark Westrum BOC Designee 
Two Bridges Regional Jail, Chair of BOC, 
President of  MJAA 
Maurice (Mo) 
Ouellette Sheriff York County, VP of Sheriff’s Association 
Peter Baldacci County Commissioner Penobscot County 
Peter Crichton County Manager Cumberland County 
Rep. Aaron Frey Representative Legislator, from Bangor, Approps. Com.  
Sen. Pat Flood Senator Legislator, Winthrop, Approps. Com. 
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V. Commission Process 
 
In order to deal with such a complex issue in such a short space of time, the Commission 
organized its work as follows: 
 
1. Six plenary meetings were conducted between September 20 and December 6, 2013, 
which were noticed and open to the public, with a broadcasting link for interested parties 
who were unable to get to Augusta for the meetings.4   
2. At the first meeting the Chair outlined a process to be followed: (i) defining the problem; 
(ii) identifying the issues; (iii) creating a vision; (iv) conducting fair, fact-based hearings; 
(v) evaluating the root causes of the problems; (vi) reviewing the pros and cons of 
alternative governance models; and (vii) identifying opportunities for savings and 
efficiencies. 
3. Invitations were sent to all groups believed to have an interest in the subject matter of 
the Commission, requesting their participation and testimony. 
4. A public hearing to take testimony was conducted on October 4, 2013. 
5. Interviews were conducted with policy makers and experts with relevant information, 
including Rod Miller, CRS Inc.; Sheriff Michael L. Chapman of Louden County, Virginia; 
Governor LePage and his legal counsel, Chief Justice Leigh Saufley and Chief Judge 
Charles Laverdiere, members of the Legislature and Elizabeth Simoni of Maine Pretrial 
Services.  
6. The Commission identified ten issues of particular concern and divided into five 
subcommittees to discuss them in depth. 
7. Those subcommittees then developed potential approaches, to the problems identified 
with each subcommittee dealing with two of the ten problems, and then, acting as a 
committee of the whole, which then polled itself on the preferred solutions.   
8. The staff developed an extensive online file of past reports evaluating the system, and 
other relevant documents, for the members’ reference. 
9. The Commission developed and discussed four general approaches to dealing with the 
issues and potential solutions: 1) return to complete management and all incremental 
funding by the individual counties; 2) development of a comprehensive regional jail 
system through four new regional authorities 3) a complete state takeover of all county 
corrections responsibilities; ; and 4) strengthening the current hybrid state/county 
approach by changing the BOC composition and granting it real authority. 
10. The commission asked the Legislative Council for an extension of the deadline for its 
work from December 4 to December 15, 2013, which was granted, and it has completed 
this final report.  
 
VI. History of County Jails in Maine, 1653-1970 
 
Just 33 years after the Pilgrims first set foot on Plymouth Rock in 1620, our Puritan ancestors 
saw fit to authorize a prison for the Province of Maine.  
                                                
4The agendas of the six meetings are attached as Appendix B.   
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After some delay, a building for this purpose was erected at Meetinghouse Creek in the Village 
of York in 1656. The present Gaol was built in 1719 with timbers salvaged from the original 
structure. With the influx of settlers into Maine in the mid-18th century, the building was 
enlarged to provide more space for the housing of prisoners, as well as improving 
accommodations for the gaoler's family. The humanitarian drive to better prison conditions for 
debtors following the American Revolution resulted in the addition of a large debtor's cell in the 
1790s, giving the building its present shape. 
 
Until 1760 the Gaol was a prison for the entire Province of Maine. It served as a county jail from 
1760 until 1820. For the next forty years it continued to be used for the incarceration of local 
wrongdoers.5 It remains in existence today as a museum. 
 
An additional jail was built as each new county was incorporated, as Maine continued the 
system created by Massachusetts after 1820, with the counties’ major role “to administer justice, 
rather than provide general services or enforce local policies.”6 
 
But some evolution did occur. Originally the jails or lockups were entirely a local responsibility. 
“Here thieves, arsonists, debtors (by far the majority), murderers and all other criminals in the 
county be held until their punishment was decided, or (until 1820) they could be dealt with at 
Massachusetts facilities.7  But county jails “became increasingly inadequate to house the State’s 
criminal population and the need for a state prison became apparent. The Thomaston facility 
opened in 1824 with a small staff of guards under Chief Warden Daniel Rose.” 8 
 
So nearly 200 years ago Maine started down the road of managing two separate jail systems, 
one county and one State. Overall, during the 19th and 20th centuries little changed in public 
policy toward the operation of the county jail system. Elected sheriffs reigned over the pretrial 
detention and correctional system in each county. Small counties with low populations built and 
maintained small jails. The reality of Maine’s geography prevented any idea of consolidation 
during the era of horse and buggy.  
 
VII. History of County Jails in Maine 1970-2008 
 
Only Sagadahoc County eventually avoided building a modern facility, instead boarding its 
inmates at neighboring jails. Then during the building boom from 1990 to 2008 Lincoln and 
Sagadahoc formed a regional jail authority and built the Two Bridges Regional Jail, 30-A MRSA 
§1801, et. seq.  
 
                                                
5  www.oldyork.org/buildings/gaol.html 12/2/13 
6  Maine had nine counties by 1820 and added seven more thereafter. “Maine Politics and Government” 
Kenneth Palmer et al, University of Nebraska Press 1992, p 173. 
7 “Maine: the Pine Tree State from Prehistory to the Present” Richard Judd et al, University of Maine 
Press 1995, p 230. 
8 Ibid., p 200. 
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Over the last several decades, other large modern facilities were constructed in Cumberland, 
York, and Somerset. Medium size jails were built in Penobscot, Kennebec, and Androscoggin. 
Smaller facilities were constructed in rural counties across the state.  
 
A rash of new construction was stimulated by a sharp increase in the number of people caught 
up in the criminal justice system in this period, and by the age and condition of some older jails.9 
 
 
 
The Department of Corrections, having regulatory oversight10, required the newer facilities to be 
built to a twenty-year projected capacity, creating a large surplus of empty beds. This surplus of 
bed space was created in anticipation of an increased crime rate. In actuality, the criminal 
                                                
9 “A 1978 statewide jail study conducted by the Maine Sheriff’s Association revealed substandard 
conditions in most Maine Jails. At that time the average age of a jail bed was 80 years. Facilities that 
were 152 years old were still in service.” “Technical Assistance Report for the Maine Board of 
Corrections,” Rod Miller and Rebecca Ney, National Institute of Corrections vs Dept. of Justice, June 28, 
2011, p. 28. Hereafter cited as “NIC Report.” 
10 The Department of Corrections sets standards for jails, conducts inspections, and is empowered to 
enforce compliance. “If a county or municipality fails to correct deficiencies and offers no plan of 
correction, or if the plan of correction offered to the department is determined inadequate by the 
commissioner, the commissioner shall determine an appropriate action to restrict or modify the operations 
of the facility, consistent with the nature of the uncorrected deficiencies, which action may include 
ordering an entire facility closed until the deficiencies have been corrected.” Emergency powers are also 
allowed if the noncompliance is determined to endanger the safety of the staff, inmates or visitors Title 
34-A MRSA § 1208. 
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caseload decreased from over 70,000 cases per year in 2009 to 57,000 cases per year in 
2013.11 
 
These thirty-million dollar facilities (Somerset, Cumberland and Two Bridges) were entirely 
funded through the county property tax and often sold to the voters with the claim that the empty 
beds would be filled by counties with overcrowded jails needing bed space. The “county 
adopted boarding rate” was set at a premium price and inmates soon became a commodity 
where counties with empty beds bid against each other for a body to fill the bed. The prices 
ranged from $80 to $150/day.   
 
During this period, the jail budget represented approximately 50% of the county assessment 
each year. The counties were proposing $110 million in capital projects to increase jail capacity 
and alleviate a perceived system-wide overcrowding issue. Major capital projects were 
proposed in Kennebec, Cumberland and Waldo counties.12  A study conducted by the Baldacci 
Administration found that capacity existed within the system and jail expenditures were growing 
at an average of 9% over the previous five years. Much of this growth was attributed to new 
debt due to jail construction.13  
 
VIII. History of County Jails in Maine 2008-2013 
 
By 2008 the county jail system was costing property taxpayers in Maine $62,000,000 annually. 
The Maine Jail and Community Corrections System Report predicted in 2008 the county system 
could have a capacity of 2,382 inmates, with the expected opening of the Somerset jail in 2009, 
a 29% increase over 2007, when the county jails were housing approximately 1,689 inmates. 
 
In addition, the State of Maine Department of Corrections was housing 2,060 adult prisoners at 
an annual cost of $79.3 million. The state system was overcrowded and the Legislature turned 
down the proposal to house prisoners out of state. Still facing an overcrowding problem, the 
state’s eyes turned to the empty beds in the county system. 
 
In response to this cost and capacity escalation, the Baldacci Administration proposed a direct 
state takeover of the county jail system, with jail administration and financing to become a 
responsibility of the State DOC.  
 
                                                
11 Jail population increased from 1,113 to 1,642 from 1999 to 2006, BJS Census of Jail Facilities 2006 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjf06.pdf. See Appendix D for charts of “Maine State Caseload 5-year 
Trends” 2009-2013.  
12 In 2003 Waldo County lost a referendum to replace its jail, and in 2008 Cumberland County lost a 
referendum to expand its medical pod. See Appendix F for a complete list of capital projects proposed in 
2007/2008  
13 CAAC Study 2006 
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After that proposal to absorb the county system failed, the State, counties and Maine Municipal 
Association entered into negotiations to unify the system. The result of those protracted 
negotiations14 was that: 
 
A. The Maine Board of Corrections (BOC) was created 34-A MRSA 1801, et seq.; 
B. The State would gain access to county beds at a marginal rate. The marginal 
rate reflected the incremental cost of adding an inmate in a facility without 
requiring additional staff, ranging from $24-$45/day depending on county, and 
that rate was set by the BOC. 
C. The property tax assessment on county corrections would be capped at the 2008 
dollar level, 30-A MRSA §701(2-A).  
D. Counties would be responsible for any debt incurred before 2008, 30-A MRSA § 
701(2-B). 
E. The Legislature would appropriate funds to meet the increasing cost of county jail 
operations through the General Fund, based on a growth rate set by the BOC, 
34-A MRSA § 1805. 
F. The Legislature would appropriate and fund a Capital Improvement Plan based 
“inversely” on the difference between the debt at 2008 and the amount of debt 
paid by the counties annually each year forward, 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(E).  
 
As a result of the 2008 reforms:  
1. The state got the needed beds at a marginal rate, which did not include any 
accounting for future capacity costs; 
2. The municipalities got the property tax capped; 
3. Overcrowding was eliminated in the county system as surplus beds were made 
available at the marginal rate; 
4. The counties received State General Fund contributions to support the jails;15 
5. Three county jails were converted to 72 hour holding facilities;16  
6. The “inverse debt” obligation to fund new capital construction was assumed, but 
then not funded, by the State;  
7. County inmates were no longer treated as a commodity to be assigned to other 
facilities on a bid basis. 
 
The Board of Corrections and members of the Corrections Working Group dedicated long days 
and thousands of hours to tackle the daunting task of creating a unified system.  
● Training seminars were offered on how the system should work.  
● Financial reporting systems were created.  
● Programs to coordinate transportation (transportation hubs) were created and large 
efficiencies were realized regarding moving county inmates around the state.  
                                                
14  LD 2080, “An Act to Better Coordinate and Reduce the Cost of the Delivery of State and County 
Correctional Services,” was signed by the Governor on April 18, 2008 and became PL 2009, Chapter 
653.  
15 See Appendix J 
16 Oxford, Franklin, and Waldo 
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At first the counties cooperated, many reluctantly, to provide budgets and plans to get the 
system moving. But, passage of the budgets became an endless task, with repeated 
submissions and onerous scrubbing of individual county budgets. 
 
It became apparent early on that deferred maintenance and capital improvements, as well as 
wage increases, had become a priority now that the state was funding incremental costs. There 
were no consequences for deficit spending or lack of capital planning.  
 
Still, most county officials felt the system could and should work to find efficiencies and 
cooperation where possible. The operational budgets were tight but in most cases adequately 
funded.  Some counties ran surpluses that were put towards capital improvements. Additional 
investment fund monies were allocated to Aroostook County to make up for a deficit at the end 
of its fiscal years. Some counties managed their budgets carefully and created small surpluses 
to fund capital improvements and innovative programming.  
 
However, the perception that the Legislature had reneged on its promise to fund the operational 
budget and the reality that the Legislature never funded the inverse debt, the defacto capital 
sinking fund, has kept the Board and counties in a carousel of endless budget proposals and 
capital needs requests. 
 
A form of battle fatigue set in with the counties.  
 
The original statute was amended to add additional county members to the board.17 The Board 
and Working Group were repopulated with new blood, but the issues hadn’t changed, and the 
working group became gridlocked with minor issues and made little progress towards 
addressing the critical issues. The Subcommittees of the working group stopped functioning. 
The budget focus group, consisting of several county finance directors, county administrators 
and state finance officials was disbanded and replaced by three BOC members. 
 
The system was floundering: 
● Money from the investment fund was diverted from the operations budgets to help 
counties pave parking lots, fix roofs and address deferred maintenance with no overall 
capital planning. Innovative programs to address recidivism had their funding cut.  
● Deficit spending continued and some wage increases far outpaced the norm for other 
Maine public sector workers.  
● Revenues for federal boarding were being used to pay debt instead of supporting the 
operational budget and the BOC faced a legal challenge over this use of funding.18 
● Jails with empty beds stopped accepting inmates from overcrowded facilities, 
compounding the problem and forcing 72 hour hold counties to drive extra miles to find a 
bed. 
 
                                                
17 County representation moved from two to four. MRSA 34-A § 1802(1). 
18 Somerset County v. State Board of Corrections, Somerset county Dkt No. AP-13-004(2013) 
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The plan to create a system designed to find efficiencies, enhance programs to reduce 
recidivism and prevent overcrowding has been lost amongst turf battles over budget dollars and 
a sense of loss of local control and the lack of funding by the Legislature. Further, the 
Appropriations Committee did not get timely information, and as a result, funding requests fell 
behind the necessary schedule. 
 
The state flat funded FY14 and FY15 appropriation to the county system19 causing cuts to  
staffing and programs as a result of the systems’ inability to make clear and convincing 
justifications in a timely manner within the state budget process. 
 
Since FY10 county jail expenditures have grown on average 2.4%, primarily in the areas of 
wages and benefits (3.4% or $6.6 million); commodities and contracts (.8% increase, or $.7 
million); while experiencing a reduction of 7.2% (-$.4 million) in capital spending. 
 
As authorized by 34-A MRSA § 1202(5), the DOC is currently providing staff support for the 
BOC, including Scott Ferguson from the DOC for financial management, while Attorney General 
Janet Mills is providing legal counsel for the Board.  
 
The DOC is further assisting the counties by providing housing for some county inmates to 
avoid local overcrowding, though there is at least one recent case in which a pretrial detainee in 
Franklin County was sent to the Men’s Correctional Center in Windham and sought bail on the 
grounds that pretrial detention in a distant state facility was a violation of his rights. The 
presiding judge has dismissed the claim, but similar cases are likely to arise.20 
 
IX. What the BOC System Has Achieved 
 
Primarily through the hard work of numerous individuals, the BOC system has made some 
progress over the preceding independent county system: 
1. Saving the DOC and the State $2.9m in the first year of operation by making jail 
beds available to State inmates at cost.21 
2. The capital construction boom has stopped, with the $100M program 
contemplated in 2008 now a dead letter.22 
3. The rapidly increasing burden on local property taxpayers was stopped in its 
tracks. 
4. Some savings have been realized by converting the Oxford, Franklin and Waldo 
county jails to 72-hour lock ups.23 
                                                
19 The Legislature appropriated FY 2010: $9,1369,506; FY 2011: $9,058,217; FY 2012: $12,650,035; FY 
2013: 12,039,128; FY 2014: $12,202,857; FY 2015: $12,202,857. 
20 Parker v State, Franklin County Superior Court. See “Attorney seeks release of suspect forced to await 
trial in distant prison,” Kaitlin Schroeder, Maine Sunday Telegram, Nov. 3, 2013, p B2 
21 NIC Report, p 6 
22 The BOC took credit for this cancellation, though Miller & Ney disagreed, arguing instead the new 
construction was merely delayed. Ibid. p 34 
23 Ibid. p 33 
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5. More savings have been achieved by development of a cooperative 
transportation system for moving prisoners around, particularly in Northern and 
Eastern Maine. 
6. The practice of setting boarding prices by bidding for inmates ended. 
 
X. What the BOC System was intended to achieve, but has not: 
 
The objectives of the BOC were set out in the legislation creating it as follows: 
The first section of the legislation, Title 34-A §1801(1), states that “The State Board of 
Corrections is an autonomous body whose purpose is to develop and implement a 
coordinated correctional system that demonstrates sound fiscal management, achieves 
efficiencies, reduces recidivism and ensures the safety and security of correctional staff, 
inmates, visitors, volunteers and surrounding communities.” The statute also directs the 
Board to develop goals including benchmarks for performance in the following areas: A. 
Recidivism reduction; B. Pretrial diversion; and C. Rate of incarceration, 34-A MRSA § 
1801(2).  
 
The actual achievements of the BOC have fallen short of the goals. For example: 
1. Costs continued to increase24 since 2008, so that Maine has a per capita cost for 
county inmates of $59.94, the tenth highest among the states. 
 
 
 
                                                
24 In the first biennium of the BOC overall costs rose at a rate of 3.5%, but in its second biennium, that 
rate decreased to 2.45%, and for FY14-15, the actual rate is believed to be 5.5%. 
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2. There has been no coordinated capital planning, and limited appropriation for capital 
construction, contrary to the “inverse debt” funding promise in 2008. 
3. The BOC has been limited in new funding from the Legislature, and appropriations 
have risen from a starting point of approximately $5.7 Million for FY2008 to 
approximately $13 Million for FY13, with the operations deficits for those 5 years made 
up by savings from the conversion of three county jails to 72-hour lock ups. 
4. The fiscal shortfall has reached the point that it is anticipated that at the current rate of 
spending, the county jails will require a supplemental appropriation of around $2.8 
million for 2014, excluding Somerset, based on current assumptions, or else will run 
out of money sometime in the fourth quarter of FY14.25  
5. The BOC has been unable to fulfill several of the statutory mandates included in the 
2008 legislation which were intended to improve management efficiency and reduce 
both recidivism and the rate of incarceration, and increase pretrial diversions.26 
6. For the most part, the BOC has been mired in a decision making impasse for a long 
time, unable to reach decisions on critical matters concerning county jail budgets and 
only recently was able to allocate some $5.6 million for programs to reduce 
recidivism.27  
 
XI. Why the BOC has failed 
 
Despite tremendous efforts by many Maine people in government at all levels and volunteers 
serving their civic duty, and the tireless leadership from BOC Chairs Neale Duffett and Col. 
Mark Westrum, the BOC has failed to achieve the initial expectations of the Legislature in 
creating this novel, hybrid system.  
 
It has failed to: 
1. Achieve cost reductions through collective contracting for goods and services; 
2. Secure budget discipline at the county level or full state funding for its budget requests; 
3. Address its mandate concerning reductions in recidivism and pretrial services; 
4. Achieve standardization regarding staffing and equipment; 
5. Develop a unified plan for capital investment; or 
6. Win the trust and confidence of the Legislature. 
 
                                                
25 See Appendix I 
26 The NIC Report contains a table at pp. 8-11 detailing the 47 statutory mandates requiring action by the 
BOC, a copy of which is attached. Of those 47, in 2011 the NIC determined that fully 15 were not 
complete, 19 were “partially complete,” and only 11 were actually completed (the rest were basically 
“unknown”). A review in connection with this report indicated that 15, including crucially, developing “goals 
to guide the development and evaluate the effectiveness” of the new system and “develop a plan for 
‘managing costs’” have not been completed. Since 2011, no additional mandates appear to have been 
completed, or even undertaken. See these tables in Appendix A.  
27 “Jails will get more funds for reducing recidivism,” Craig Crosby, Portland Press Herald, Nov. 25, 2013, 
p C1 
27 
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The BOC legislation has failed to adequately address 10 specific and serious problems 
identified by the Commission including: 
1. An unrealistic funding process; 
2. Lack of authority for the BOC 
3. Too much time spent by the BOC on budget approval; 
4. Goals and objectives neither defined nor met; 
5. No jail standardization; 
6. Innovative and high quality programs and incentives sacrificed; 
7. Too many jails “not obeying the rules”; 
8. The current funding crisis; 
9. Excessive pre-trial populations, cooperation with the judicial system; and 
10. Mental health needs inadequately addressed. 
 
What are the root causes of these results? 
 
1. Lack of a vision that the jails are part of a Statewide criminal justice system which should be 
for the common benefit and protection, and the equal distribution of the common burden, of all 
the people of Maine.  
 
As the framers of the US Constitution argued, the safety of society is among the transcendent 
objects of government, and justice is its purpose.28 
 
As noted above, criminal justice started out in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as a county 
responsibility, as the dictates of colonial transportation and communications demanded. 
 
Since then Maine has successfully modified other institutions in its criminal justice system, as 
the courts now operate on a statewide basis, with its judges now funded through the state 
General Fund, though the counties retain a role in owning and maintaining courthouses. 
 
Likewise, the District Attorney system has been updated, with multi-county districts and state 
funding for the salaries of the District Attorneys and their assistants, 30-A MRSA § 255(2).  
 
The result of the continued fragmented jail system has been a lack of reasonably equal 
opportunities for pre-trial services for diversion programs, regardless of location, and a 
significant disparity in the tax burden among the various counties,29 as well as inability to 
achieve potential economies of scale and other efficiencies. 
  
This lack of vision for a single statewide criminal justice system has contributed to the problems 
identified by the Commission. 
  
                                                
28 The Federalist Papers No. 43 and 51 (Madison). 
29 See Appendix H 
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2. BOC representation and lack of ownership of this hybrid organization by the Legislature and 
Administration.  
 
As the NIC report explains, “There are no counterparts to the Board’s structure in other 
states...the difficulties encountered in Maine in the last four years explain why no other state has 
tried a similar approach. We believe that no one will be looking to Maine as a model.”30 
 
The BOC does not have an independent source of funding. It is entirely dependent on the 
counties through the property tax, and the Legislature through the General Fund. 
 
But the Board now consists of nine members, of whom four are county officials, and only two 
representative of the interests and concerns of the Administration. Additionally one is a 
municipal official, while two represent the general public, one of whom should be a mental 
health specialist, 34-A MRSA § 1802(1). 
 
In 34-A MRSA § 1801 the Legislature declared the BOC to be an “autonomous body.” But it 
does not operate in a vacuum, and is dependent on the Counties, and increasingly, the State, 
for appropriations. There is no escaping the reality its budget priorities must compete with all 
others vying for State funds. 
 
There is a risk that the absence of adequate representation reflecting the priorities of the payor, 
leads to a loss of understanding of the needs of the county corrections system by the 
Legislature and a lack of confidence in the decisions the Board is making. 
 
A dominant representation by county officials also contributes to a lack of incentive to scrutinize 
county jail operations and to make hard decisions. These realities have contributed to State 
appropriations less than the BOC has requested and a total lack of State investment in the 
capital investment sinking fund. 
 
This lack of ‘ownership’ has contributed to several of the problems identified by the 
Commission.  
 
On the other hand, extensive county representation does provide much needed experience and 
expertise concerning the county jail system, which is valuable in the BOC’s deliberations. The 
Legislature will have to resolve the tension between these two competing considerations. 
 
3. Lack of incentives and disincentives for systematic collaboration by the counties. 
 
While individual counties readily reach informal, ad hoc mutual aid agreements, there is no 
culture or tradition of consistent collaboration to achieve the standardization necessary to 
realize long term economies of scale.  
 
                                                
30 NIC Report,  p 36 
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Every county, understandably, seeks to maximize its own benefit, rather than optimize results 
system wide. Understandable, because there are few incentives in the form of retaining savings, 
eligibility for programs or avoiding sanctions. The result is a confederacy of autonomous 
governmental units acting in their own best interests, rather than a union looking to achieve 
common standards and making the best use of resources for the whole state. 
 
This lack of incentives and disincentives for systematic collaboration by the counties has 
contributed to many of the problems identified by the Commission.  
 
4. Lack of executive leadership. 
 
The BOC is a part-time job for nominal consideration for its members, yet has consumed an 
enormous amount of their time and attention.31 
 
It has suffered from the lack of a consistent, full-time, professional, empowered executive and a 
finance director who can organize agendas, prioritize issues, scrutinize budgets and collect 
information, so that the Board members themselves can concentrate on broad policy issues. 
Fortunately, an executive director and financial analyst have both been hired this fall. 
 
This shortcoming has resulted in at least two major problems that have crippled the system: 
1. The board members themselves have ended up consuming all available time on 
reviewing the minutia of the individual county budgets, repeatedly sending 
versions back for revision, but not assembling a single overall budget within 
realistic parameters. 
2. Because all the time and effort of the BOC has been expended on budget review, 
the Board has been unable to take action on the many other mandates 
established by the legislature as outlined in Appendix A. 
 
Thus, the lack of an empowered executive has contributed to the problems identified by the 
Commission.  
 
5. Lack of common accounting standards. 
 
The lack of uniformity in how the counties account for expenditures, and of standardization for 
metrics, makes it very difficult to measure performance or even compare correlations-related 
spending among the various counties.32 
 
A good example of this problem was provided in the RHR Smith report: “Since costs are not 
categorized consistently, it may be time consuming to identify and quantify potential savings. 
                                                
31 5 MRSA §1200A-G, sub-§ 6-C 
32 “There have been instances of inconsistency, resulting from the Counties’ lack of clear understanding 
of their responsibilities and of the BOC’s expectations regarding budgeting, allocations, cash flow needs, 
fund balance and contingency funding. This makes it difficult to compare data between time periods on 
countries for meaningful analysis,” Smith, p 4. 
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Using information technology for example, IT costs may be included in capital, wages and/or 
contracts, making them difficult to isolate or measure.” 33 
 
In turn, lack of metrics makes it extremely difficult analyzing where economies of scale and 
efficiencies of performance may be achieved. 
 
It may be that the BOC has the implied authority to require such accounting and reporting 
standardization, under 34-A MRSA § 1801(1), 1803(1)(A) and 1803(5)(D), and 30-A MRSA § 
710(1), but if so, it has failed to effectively exercise such authority. 
 
The lack of such standards has contributed to several of the problems identified by the 
Commission.  
 
6. Lack of will and authority at the BOC to make and enforce critical decisions. 
 
The system suffers from the failure of the BOC to present budgets to the Legislature that drive 
down the requests of the various counties to a realistic overall figure, instead acquiescing in the 
incremental demands of the counties. 
 
Likewise, the Board has been unwilling to enforce decisions against uncooperative counties that 
fail to conform with its policies and rules, for example the refusal of Somerset County to accept 
prisoners from other counties.  
 
This problem was summed up in the NIC report: “One of the issues most often cited by those 
interviewed is the perception the BOC does not exercise its leadership and decision-making 
authority to [move toward a version of One Maine, One System].”34 
 
Many interviewees put it succinctly: “There are too many meetings that don’t accomplish 
anything.”35 
 
The lack of will by the BOC to make and enforce decisions has contributed to the problems 
identified by the Commission. 
 
7. Lack of a mechanism for planning and funding capital expenditures. 
 
There is no centralized record of how much has been spent on capital projects since the BOC 
was created. 
 
                                                
33 Smith, p 7. Likewise, the BOC lacks reliable non-financial metrics as well. “The BOC has not developed 
a plan for measuring its progress beyond costs benefits. Some, like pretrial services, do attempt to 
quantify their outcomes, but generally the notion of a performance management plan does not yet exist.” 
NIC Report, p 17.  
34 NIC Report, p 16.  
35 NIC Report, p 14.  
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Likewise, there is no CRAS module for uniform accounting for capital expenditures.  
 
Further, there is no mechanism for compiling aggregated data as to the needs for capital 
investment to maintain or replace facilities, let alone for prioritizing needs.  
 
Instead, there is a passive certificate of need review process under which the BOC is to rule on 
the merits of such proposals or individual counties may care to make. 34-A MRSA § 1803 (4). 
 
Or, in the alternative, counties can ask for ad hoc funding for capital projects out of the 
Investment Fund, which is primarily intended as the vehicle to fund General Fund contributions 
to the county corrections operations but, confusingly, also can be used to pay for capital 
projects. 34-A MRSA § 1806(2). 
 
In practice, such requests are made without reference to an overall plan or consistent with any 
articulated criteria. 
 
Without any comprehensive plan, any criteria for funding projects, any priorities, any guess as to 
the total amount which may be needed from year to year, or even any consistent mechanism, it 
is hardly surprising that the Legislature has never funded the Inverse Debt account intended to 
fund county corrections capital projects. 34-A MRSA § 1803 (5) (E). 
 
Yet, the physical infrastructure inexorably ages and, according to the 2013 BJA study,  
decays.36 
 
The lack of such a mechanism for planning and funding has contributed substantially to the 
failure to do the necessary planning and investing. 
 
In closing this analysis, we need to state that these problems are not the products of failings on 
the part of individuals. Many good Maine people have worked hard these last five years to try to 
make this hybrid system work. The problems are not individuals, but flawed institutions, 
complicated legal arrangements and inadequate mechanisms for achieving progress. 
 
They are problems that can be solved. 
 
XII. The concerns of the Legislature 
 
In its communication to the Criminal Justice Committee of June 3, the Appropriations Committee 
noted that the jails were acting like a decentralized confederation, and that several problems 
had arisen as a result, including: 
1. Constant adjustments to the budget; 
2. Inability to coordinate and control operations among the counties; 
3. Inability by the BOC to enforce its decisions; 
                                                
36 Miller 2013 Bureau of Justice Administration, USDOJ study, p 3. 
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4. Counties opting out of the system with impunity; 
5. Uncertainty as to the amount of revenues available because of the unilateral actions of 
some counties; and 
6. Inequity in the sharing of the burden of capital construction debt. 
 
In sum, the Committee expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the BOC to manage its 
finances and create the unified system originally envisioned.37 
 
XIII. Statement of the Problem 
 
The identification of the issues related to the shortcomings of the current system led the 
Commission to adopt the following statement of the problem: 
 
Maine has adopted a system of governance of its county jails and lockups that 
fragments decision-making with respect to (1) raising revenues; (2) managing budgets; 
and (3) achieving operational efficiency, which has resulted in uncertainty, absence of 
accountability, deteriorating incentives for efficiency and now a funding crisis. 
 
The mandate of this Commission, of course, was not just to identify the problems, or to analyze 
their root causes, but to go further and come up with recommendations for solutions.  
 
XIV. Alternative Models for Restructuring and Reform 
 
We have described a formidable set of problems, and analyzed what we believe are their 
fundamental root causes.  
 
The Commission evaluated four potential approaches to addressing these issues: 
 
1. Return to the pre-2008 system of individual county responsibility. 
This approach has the virtues of reasonably clear accountability for a single political 
decision-maker, the County Commissioners, although there is some ambiguity in the 
relative accountability of the Commissioners and the Sheriffs38, and a reintegration of 
decision-maker and taxing authority. 
 
But any possibility of state-wide efficiencies and economies of scale would be greatly 
diminished, and we believe it would be impossible to break the freeze on local property 
tax increases. 
 
So we do not recommend this approach. 
 
                                                
37 For the full text of the letter, see Appendix C.  
38 30-A MRSA § 1501 provides that the Sheriff has custody and charge of the jail...and the appointment of 
the jail (administrator). But in 30-A MRSA § 709, the County Commissioners are responsible for setting 
the annual budget to the BOC. 
 24 
2. Create four regional jail authorities. 
This proposal called for dividing Maine into four mandatory regional authorities modeled 
along the lines of the Two Bridges Regional Jail Authority, with multiple counties 
cooperating to achieve regional efficiencies and economies of scale, programs, shared 
accommodations, training, etc.  
 
But the Commission was concerned such an approach would also serve to create more 
sub-state bureaucracies without addressing the causes of the deadlocks that have 
characterized the current system. 
 
Still, there can be a constructive role for voluntary collaboration among various counties 
on different issues, and our recommended approach recognizes and encourages such 
arrangements, where they do not conflict with the exercise of authority by the BOC or 
the DOC.  
 
3. A DOC takeover of the county jail system. 
Again, this approach would have the virtue of reuniting decision-making with taxing 
authority, and take advantage of a unified command and control system that could 
provide consistency in policy and administration statewide, with a greater opportunity to 
realize economies of scale.  
 
On the other hand, a single statewide system would be unable to adjust to local pay 
scales and thus might incur additional, unnecessary costs. 
 
More importantly, such unification would overturn 350 years of political culture and 
tradition in Maine, requiring a redefinition of the roles of county officials and employees, 
and perhaps of the county government system itself.  
 
We are not prepared to recommend this step, but future Legislatures may find such 
restructuring necessary if the approach we do recommend fails to successfully resolve 
the issues facing the current system. 
 
4.  Restructure the current BOC system. 
Considering the numerous, serious problems of the current system, it is reasonable to 
question whether it can achieve its goals with only a few, pivotal statutory changes. 
 
We believe that with the right leadership structure, proper incentives and disincentives 
for system participants, and legal authority to require standardization in key areas, the 
original goals of controlling costs, achieving statewide consistency and minimizing 
additional infrastructure can be achieved.  
 
We recommend this set of reforms because achieving Maine’s objectives in the least 
disruptive way, preserving as much of our traditional system as we can, seems the most 
prudent course of action.  
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Those few, pivotal reforms are as follows. 
 
XV. Recommendations 
 
The Commission formulates its recommendations in the form of responses to the root causes of 
the problems identified, as follows: 
1. VISION 
a. Root Cause 
The BOC has lacked a unifying vision to support its various activities and 
the energy to set a direction and make progress. 
      b.  Solution 
 The State and the counties should commit themselves by law to a set of 
common purposes to be established by the Legislature, including: 
 (i) protection of public safety statewide; 
 (ii) assurance of equal treatment in the criminal justice system statewide; 
 (iii) movement towards equality in the tax effort devoted to county 
corrections statewide;  
 (iv) actions to achieve efficiencies, economies of scale, and full utilization 
of facilities statewide; 
 (v) a reduction in recidivism 
 (vi) collaboration with and coordination of programs and services with the 
DOC. 
Such a solution would be consistent with recommendation A-15 of the 
NIC USDOJ report of 2011 which advocated “the Board should seek legislation 
to redefine the scope of [its] purpose and authority.”39  
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
 The adoption of a vision of a unified, statewide system relates to the 10 
problems identified by the Commission.  
d.  Statutory changes needed 
 34-A MRSA § 1801(2) already empowers the BOC to adopt goals and 
objectives. The BOC has also adopted some useful “Guiding Principles,”40 
which have provided some parameters for action, but express neither a vision 
nor a set of goals, both of which are needed to energize the system. 
Therefore, § 1801(2) should be amended to express the statewide goals 
and mission of the BOC.  
 
  
                                                
39  NIC Report, p 18  
40 “The Guiding Principles” are set out in Appendix G. 
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2. BOC REPRESENTATION 
a. Root Cause 
Currently the BOC’s membership consists of four representatives of 
various county interests, two Administration, one municipal and two public 
members, following amendment of the statute in 2011.41 
 The amendment was added to assure a high level of county corrections 
expertise within the BOC, but it came at the cost of further isolating the BOC from 
the State government, which provides an ever increasing share of the costs, and 
promotes a culture of mutual forbearance among the counties, which in turn has 
contributed to an impasse in decision making. 
b.  Solution 
 It might have been helpful to the BOC in successfully carrying out its 
mission if the (i) Legislative and Executive branches have confidence in its 
membership, (ii) the Board operate with a manageable size and odd number of 
members, (iii) that the interests of the taxpayers be represented, as well as (iv) 
retaining the perspective and expertise of the counties. 
Such a recommendation would have been consistent with the 
findings of NIC, USDOJ that “the Board should evaluate its membership 
annually and determine if changes should be made in its composition 
and/or the composition of its committees.”42 
 It might be argued that membership should be made in accordance with 
the proportional revenue contributions to the support of the jails. But since the 
State is putting in 100% of the marginal cost, it also could be argued that they 
should have the decisive voice in how its contribution is spent. In any event, a 
majority of the Commission members decided that the benefits of retaining the 
current representation of the counties outweighed other considerations.  
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
 Changing composition of the membership of the Board to reflect State 
and taxpayer interests relates to the 10 problems identified by the Commission. 
d.  Statutory changes needed 
 34-A MRSA § 1802 it was proposed this be amended to provide for a 
manageably sized council representative of the funders of the system, its 
operators and the public. It is reasonable to stay with nine members, nominated 
by the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature, but with a new composition, 
as follows: 
i.  One County Commissioner; 
ii.  One Sheriff; 
iii. One County Manager/ Administrator; 
iv. The Commissioner of Corrections, or his designee; 
v. The Commissioner of DAFS, or his designee; and 
                                                
41 PL 2011, Ch. 374 §9 The current membership is shown on the table in Appendix E 
42 NIC Report, p. 18 
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vi. Four members of the public, with relevant experience or appropriate 
professional credentials. But again, the decision was made to recommend 
staying with the current membership composition. 
 In any event, beyond professional qualifications, what the BOC urgently 
needs are members who have a commitment to a Statewide vision, to 
promoting efficiency, and to decisive leadership. 
 
3. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT POWER 
a. Root Cause 
The BOC has acted as if it is unable to enforce its authority, and has only 
offered incentives to encourage innovation infrequently. 
      b.  Solution 
 The BOC will accomplish little without the power to enforce its judgments. 
In this context both financial and operational sanctions are indispensable, 
including: 
(i) The power to award discretionary funding to support innovative or  
efficient programs 
(ii) To incentivize counties to operate as efficiently as possible, it should 
be able to retain the current year savings it achieves through good corrections 
management without an offset of the State or County appropriations otherwise 
due. The county can use such savings for reinvestment within the jail facility, 
including funding otherwise unfunded liabilities up to amounts approved by its 
auditors. 
(iii) The disposition of federal and State boarding revenues cuts both 
ways. If all the revenue accrues to the host county, it is incentivized to maximize 
such revenue, given the higher boarding rates paid by the federal government, 
which reduces financial burden on that county.  
On the other hand, such a revenue maximization strategy can hurt other 
counties if the federal prisoner maximizing county sends its own inmates to other 
counties at a lower rate, or forces other overcrowded counties to transport its 
inmates a greater distance to another less crowded facility. 
A majority of the Commission concluded that all such revenue should 
accrue to the benefit of the host county, and not be used to offset State or 
County appropriations otherwise due. 
Whichever way the Legislature decides, the law should be amended to 
provide a clear rule on the division of boarding revenue to forestall future, 
unproductive disputes at the BOC. 
(iv) The power to withhold payments otherwise due to counties who: 
 - refuse to accept prisoners assigned; 
 - fail to comply with accounting and budgeting protocols; 
 - fail to curtail spending when directed to do so; 
 - improperly refund monies to counties; 
 - fail to operate in accordance with standards set by the BOC  
or DOC; 
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 - fail to offer programs and services as required by the BOC or  
DOC 
(v) In the event of serious or systematic failure to comply with regulations, 
standards or policies of the BOC, they have the authority to request the 
DOC to assume operational control of a correctional facility in the non-
compliant county, with appropriate funding adjustments. 
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
     While the BOC is charged with many responsibilities, providing adequate 
authority to enforce its decisions will address several of the 10 problems 
identified by the Commission.  
     d.  Statutory changes needed 
 34-A MRSA § 1806 should be amended to add a new subsection giving 
the BOC explicit authority to withhold funds otherwise due or declare a county 
ineligible to receive some or all funds during periods when it is in non-compliance 
with the directives, policies or rules of the BOC, or, in serious cases, recommend 
assumption of control of a facility by the DOC. 
 
4. LACK OF EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP 
a. Root Cause 
The BOC has been in existence for six years. During that period it has 
employed four executive directors. Besides lack of continuity, the Board has not 
defined of the role of Director in a way that has empowered its staff with 
leadership responsibility. 
As a result, the Commission itself has taken on much of the staff role, 
getting lost in detail, rather than setting broad priorities and advocacy effectively 
for its principles, protocols and budgets. 
AS RHR Smith and Co. recommended in their review of BOC operations, 
“Analyzing and reconciling financial information before meetings can help free up 
the BOC to focus on its stated mission. Many of [its] initiatives...will require the 
time and ability to engage in strategic planning, cost benefits analysis, and 
building partnerships.”43 
      b.  Solution 
 In its recent report, RHR Smith, observed “there are no internal policies 
that clearly define goals, roles and responsibilities for the BOC Executive 
Director…”44 
 The role, responsibilities and pay grade of the Executive Director should 
be defined in BOC regulations.  
There should be a clear understanding that the BOC is responsible for 
setting policy and enforcing decisions, while the Director is responsible for the 
staff work, data collection and analysis of the Commission and carrying out the 
policies of the Board. 
                                                
43 Smith, p 9 
44 Smith, p 7  
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The addition of a financial director to the organization should also prove 
helpful in the immediate future.  
It is critical the BOC staff develops strong working relationships with both 
the counties and the DOC.  
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
   Strengthening the role of the Executive Director relates to the 10 
problems identified by the Commission.   
d. Statutory changes needed 
 34-A MRSA § 1803-A should be amended to explicitly define the roles 
and pay grades of the Director, Financial Analyst and Fiscal Agent, since the 
BOC has not done so. 
 Moreover, the BOC should be able to call on the expertise and resources 
of the DOC to minimize the growth of a new bureaucracy. 
 
5. LACK OF COMMON ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
a. Root Cause 
In the original 2008 legislation, the BOC was empowered to require a 
common budget reporting system, 30-A MRSA § 710(1). 
However, this authority has proven too inconsistent, and in a detailed and 
critical report in June 2013, the authors concluded “There have been instances of 
inconsistency, resulting from the counties’ lack of clear understanding of their 
responsibilities, and the BOC’s expectations, regarding budgeting, allocation, 
cash flow needs, fund balance and contingency funding, thus making it difficult to 
compare data between time periods or counties for meaningful analysis.”45     
b.  Solution 
 As RHR Smith noted, “The ability to capture, analyze and interpret 
financial information that is reliable, credible and accurate is essential to the 
BOC’s process. This information can be used to make routine decisions, project 
future expenditures, and communicate current and future needs of the 
Investment Fund to counties, the general public, and the Legislature with 
confidence.”46 
 Thus, requiring a common chart of accounts and consistency of coding 
expenses, and adopting consistent fiscal policies and auditing policies must be at 
the heart of any reform to make the BOC effective. Likewise, both technical 
assistance to the counties and compliance mechanisms will be necessary to 
bring the process to life. 
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
Requiring consistent financial and performance data related to the 10 
problems identified by the Commission.  
d.  Statutory changes needed 
                                                
45 Smith, p 4 
46 Smith, p 9 
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 34-A MRSA § 1803 should be amended to give the BOC the authority to 
establish and enforce a single chart of accounts for county corrections-related 
expenditures for all financial management purposes. Additionally, to require 
budget submissions by the counties in a manner consistent with and timed to 
integrate with the State budgeting and auditing processes. 
 
6. LACK OF WILL OR AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS 
a. Root Cause 
While the BOC reports extraordinary frustration at its inability to fulfill its 
mission or execute its policies, there is a legitimate question as to what is holding 
it back other than an attitude of deference towards individual counties. 
 
For example: 
(i) Somerset County is refusing to accept prisoners from other counties 
because it thinks the boarding rate is unfair. But the BOC has taken no action to 
compel Somerset to fulfill its statutory duty, allowing the county to take the 
initiative with its own lawsuit concerning funding. 
(ii) Meanwhile, Franklin County is forced to send prisoners to State post-
conviction facilities in Windham instead of to Skowhegan 25 miles away. 
(iii) Waldo County is, by its own admission, refunding $233,000 to its 
taxpayers, rather than meeting its obligations to the overall state system, thus 
increasing the amount the BOC must seek from the General Fund. 
(iv) The BOC has been unable to decide whether to ask the Legislature to 
fund either its “actual” or a maximal budget for FY14, and has not yet approved 
any budget for FY15, thus jeopardizing its opportunity to secure needed funding. 
(v) Some counties are not providing the financial data necessary to 
formulate an accurate budget, but the BOC has been unable to correct this 
problem; and 
(vi) Washington and Hancock Counties, for instance, are enduring 
significant facility deterioration without any assistance from the BOC. 
These are illustrations of current problems in decision-making at the 
BOC, rather than an exhaustive list. 
      b.  Solution 
 The solutions to the paralysis in decision-making are: 
 (i) increase the authority of the BOC to mandate policies and actions of 
Statewide significance, including the ability to enter into contracts binding on all 
the counties to achieve economies of scale; 
 (ii) ensure the BOC has a set of incentives and sanctions sufficient to 
enforce its decisions. 
c.  Relationship of solution to problems identified 
Reforming the authority of the BOC is absolutely essential to making the 
organization useful for achieving standardization, economies of scale and 
efficiencies any time soon, and will help resolve several of the ten major issues.  
     d. Statutory changes needed 
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(i) Rulemaking: The BOC should have the authority to set policies and 
adopt routine technical rules to promote consistent management of operations, 
encourage innovative programs and services and undertake long term planning 
for capital needs.  
  The Commission also proposes that the Criminal Justice Committee 
authorize any major new substantive rules to facilitate the aforementioned 
activities and additionally to empower the BOC with the authority to implement 
and enforce compliance with its decisions. 
(ii) Standards: To promote efficiency and fairness, the BOC should have 
the authority to set and enforce standards concerning: 
● Management Information Systems and their interconnections; 
● Security equipment; 
● Inmate classification; 
● Pretrial services; 
● Assignment of inmates among the county jails; 
● Staffing qualifications and ratios; and 
● Bed space determination/ classification. 
(iii) Contracting: Amend 34-A MRSA §1803(1)(f) to maximize the potential 
savings that might be realized from contracting for goods and services that can 
be used by multiple counties, the BOC should have the authority to contract on 
behalf of any or all of the counties unilaterally, to either piggy-backing on State 
DOC contracts or acting on its own for: 
● Medical and mental health services; 
● Pharmaceuticals; 
● Food and food services; 
● Appliances and equipment; 
● Telecommunications equipment and computer hardware and 
software; 
● Insurance policies; and 
● Other goods and services it may identify by policy from time to 
time. 
(iv) Back Office Services: The BOC should have the authority to provide 
support services needed by any county correctional systems, on a contractual 
basis with the consent of an interested county for: 
● Hiring and human resources; 
● Civil rights; 
● Risk management and insurance; 
● Training; 
● Financial management, budgeting and procurement;  
● Management information systems; and 
● Other services it may identify from time to time. 
(v) Assignment of Inmates: The BOC should have the authority to 
establish and maintain a coordinated system for pre-trial detainees and others 
housed in the county jails as follows: 
● The BOC shall establish rules under which it may demand any 
county facility to accept any inmate from any other county facility, 
the State or the Federal government. 
● The BOC shall set standards for the software necessary to 
facilitate transportation of inmates among facilities so as to create 
a truly Statewide system of assignments. 
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(vi) Regional Authorities: The various counties are encouraged to enter 
into mutual, voluntary agreements to procure and provide goods and services 
and mutual aid of any kind, and in fact, is strongly encouraged by the 
Commission, on such terms and conditions as they may from time to time agree, 
so long as such agreements are limited to subjects and to the extent to which the 
DOC or BOC have not exercised such authority. 
(vii) Monitoring Performance: The BOC should have the authority to 
monitor the operational, programmatic and financial performance of the county 
jails and to establish appropriate metrics for comparison of the counties among 
themselves and with other appropriate jurisdictions, and require timely reporting 
in a consistent format, with appropriate penalties for non-compliance. 
 
XVI. Additional Recommendations 
 
In addition to the foregoing recommendations intended to address the root causes of the 
problems which have made the current system largely unsuccessful, there are administrative 
measures which we believe would make the current system more workable, as follows: 
Budget Reform 
a. Adopt a growth formula to standardize and guide budget planning. 
Create and adopt a biennial budget growth formula for budget planning purposes 
that projects approved future growth in operational costs, and a second for 
capital costs. The operational formula would be based on the LD 1 cap as 
applied currently to the county payments. 30-A MRSA § 706(A)(1). 
 
A formula for replacing the current “actual costs of corrections” standard (34-A 
MRSA § 1803(5) (E)) with an objective measure consistent with the discipline 
elsewhere in government for operations expenditure budgeting would reduce 
uncertainty and eliminate creation of unrealistic budget proposals which cost 
considerable time and effort. 
b.  The County Corrections budget process should track and be synchronized with  
the State process. 
Budget instructions based on the Growth Formula should be sent from DAFS to 
the BOC. The BOC should transmit the same to the Counties, based on a BOC 
approved allocation formula. 
 
The County Commissioners, after consultation with the Sheriffs, Jail 
Administrators and other relevant officials should submit a two part budget in a 
DAFS-approved format to the BOC. Part 1 would continue current operations. 
Part 2 would propose any additional programs, services or other initiatives a 
County wishes to propose. 
 
After review, revisions and approval, under 34-A MRSA §1803(1)(A), the BOC 
would approve any Part 1 request of a County, which is below the Growth 
Formula cap.  
 
The BOC would review and vote on any Part 2 requests by any County, in its 
submission to DAFS. The BOC will be required to rule in a timely manner on 
such requests to stay within the State budget process timeline. 
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In the event the Governor reduces or eliminates any BOC requests from his 
budget, the BOC shall have the right to report its original request directly to the 
Legislature. 
 
In the event the Legislature appropriates less than the full Part 1 amount 
requested, the BOC shall allocate the deficiency among the Counties to minimize 
the impact on county corrections operations overall. 
 
c. Benefits  
The Legislature is currently unaware of the full extent of county corrections  
systems needs. Moreover, the BOC consumes extraordinary amounts of time 
examining the detail of Part 1. This separation of on-going LD 1 capped funding 
from consideration of new and additional spending in excess of the cap should 
reduce the amount of time the BOC uses up on budget issues.  
 
d. Statutory Changes Needed  
Amend 34-A § 1803(5) (E) by replacing “actual costs” with an amount not in  
excess of the cap generally applicable to County expenditures contained in  
30-A MRSA § 706(A). In addition, the BOC may request additional  
appropriations, clearly identified for new or expanded programs or under the  
emergency circumstances described in 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(D).      
 
 
XVII. Capital Planning and Finance 
 
1. Current Situation 
Since the BOC was established, no new county correctional facility has been 
constructed.  
 
However, the Legislature clearly contemplated that the BOC would play a role in the 
closure of older or unneeded facilities, and changes in the missions of existing facilities. 
34-A MRSA §1803(2)(A) and (C ).  
 
Likewise, the BOC was given the authority to review and either approve or reject plans 
for new facilities using a “certificate of need” process, 34-A MRSA §1803(4).  
 
Pursuant to these responsibilities, the BOC developed a “Draft Policy Statement” entitled 
“One Maine One System” to govern capital improvement planning for county correctional 
facilities in June, 2009.47 
 
It was considered by the BOC at its November and December, 2011 meetings, but not 
adopted as presented. 
 
It would have required a 10 year capital improvement plan (CIP) for each county, though 
priorities could be adjusted during that period. It called for the counties to use up their 
“fund balances” at the end of a FY first, and then apply to the BOC for additional funds 
needed.  
 
                                                
47 “One Maine, One System - A Plan for a Unified State Correctional System for Maine,” created by Maine 
DOC, June 2009, Appendix L 
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Capital funding is also supposed to be made available through the “Inverse Debt” fund, 
34-A MRSA §1803(5)(E), but in fact no funds have actually been appropriated for this 
purpose. It is hardly surprising the Legislature would not assign this cause high priority in 
the absence of a comprehensive Statewide capital plan demonstrating needs, and 
setting priorities. 
 
In particular, there have been no further changes or mission closures or new 
construction since the first days of the BOC. 
 
Still, in the past 10 years, there has been further deterioration and decay in the physical 
plants at several jails, and minor capital investments by individual counties acting on 
their own.48 
 
The RHR Smith accounting review also faulted the planning process, observing “the 
BOC lacks policies for dealing with counties’ capital and noncapital contingencies. This 
makes demand on the Investment Fund hopelessly unpredictable.”49 
 
Besides the absence of long term planning and a mechanism for prioritizing capital 
projects, there are further important problems in the financing of projects. 
 
For short-term projects, the problem is that the ability to finance them depends on the 
amount a county happens to have in its surplus in a given year, regardless of how its 
needs compare in urgency to other counties. 
 
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the Commission recommends that the Counties be 
authorized to utilize surplus funds to create their own capital improvement accounts and 
accounts to cover unfunded liabilities up to levels approved by their auditors, which shall 
not offset State or County appropriations otherwise due. 
 
For long-term, major projects, the cost must be borne by county taxpayers, regardless of 
the relative tax effort needed. Thus, a poor county might defer a greatly needed project, 
while a wealthier county can afford a less compelling project.  
 
The costs of the present system are well illustrated by the plight of Somerset County, 
which voted for a $29.2m facility to be paid for by a county bond issue, which has 
resulted in a per capita cost of $20.62.  
 
In considering the bed mechanism to fund capital needs, the Commission believes, the 
BOC should develop a long term plan to alter the property tax burden for the counties to 
equalize citizen contributions to county jail operations and existing and future capital 
debt service expense, including through application of state funds appropriated for that 
purpose, by accounting for an appropriate proportion of non-property tax revenues for 
jail operations, such as prisoner boarding and per diem revenues from state and federal 
sources, and by other means to equalize property tax burdens.    
 
2.  Options for Capital Investment in the Future 
 There are four aspects to capital investment in county correctional facilities: 
  A. Planning; 
                                                
48 BJA Report, p 3 
49 Smith, p 5 
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  B. Financing; 
  C. Ownership; and 
D. Location. 
  
For each of these factors the responsibility could be placed with the county, the State or 
the BOC. 
 
Many permutations have been adopted in Maine for other capital projects by other 
government agencies. 
 
Historically, of course, jails were planned, paid for and owned by the counties. 
 
But, as the State establishes standards and the BOC legislation contemplates a unified 
system, such autonomy seems inconsistent with the purposes of the law. 
 
A second model is that of regional jail authorities like the Two Bridges Facility in 
Wiscasset, with regional planning, finances and ownership, but the experience of TBJA 
has been fraught with conflict and litigation. 
 
A third is using the State DOC for all four. This would raise problems with the 
management and use of a state facility by different organizations.  
 
A fourth alternative would be something akin to the system Maine uses for funding new 
school construction. 
 
In the case of the schools, local districts do the planning in accordance with State 
standards, the Board of Education prioritizes projects against established criteria, and 
financing is shared by the State, through the GPA funds, and the local district by a bond 
issue. 
 
The advantages of this model applied to development of a unified county corrections 
system include: 
(a) consistent standards for planning; 
(b) prioritization of projects on a statewide basis; 
(c) sharing the costs between the local organizations and the state, taking into 
account ability to pay;  
(d) ownership by the entity that will be managing, staffing and using the facility; 
and 
(e) proper determination of need and location for any new jail construction.  
 
The day will come when a jail must be replaced because of age and condition. In the 
meantime, there will be a continued need for capital upgrades and preventative 
maintenance and equipment replacement. Yet we do not have a handle on the size or 
pace of needs, or its relationship to the “inverse debt.” Maine urgently needs to adopt a 
rational, planned capital expenditures budget. An approach based on the current K-12 
school construction system may be an appropriate template. 
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XVIII. Conclusion  
 
The Appropriations Committee in its June 3, 2013 letter characterized the current system as a 
“confederation.” 
 
That is a bad thing - confederations don’t tend to last very long or work very effectively. 
 
As Alexander Hamilton observed in advocating for replacing the Articles of Confederation 
Government of the American States with a union under a new constitution, organizations 
without the power to raise revenue or enforce their decisions are devoid of energy and destined 
to fail.50 
 
The Committee expressed concern that the BOC lacked operational control or enforcement 
capacity or the ability to ensure receipt of its revenues. 
 
The analysis and recommendations in the report are intended to remedy those problems, and 
create the unified system originally envisioned, with the least disruption possible to the 
traditional institutions in Maine government. 
 
We have tried to achieve that balance by recommending legislation to provide for:  
1. A greater vision of a single system achieving economies of scale, prioritized capital 
planning, operational efficiencies, universally accessible pretrial services and a 
reasonably equitable distribution of the tax burden; 
2. Financial and operational incentives and sanctions to promote compliance with the 
regulations, policies and disincentives of the BOC; 
3. Explicitly defined responsibilities for the BOC executive leadership, to free up the 
Commission members to focus on broad public policies; 
4. Adoption and enforcement of common accounting standards and performance reporting 
metrics;  
5. Conferring on the authority to the BOC to enter into  contracts on behalf of the counties, 
provide back office services, coordinate prisoner assignments and evaluate 
appropriation requests to the Legislature, among other things; 
6. Create a mechanism for planning and funding capital expenditures on an orderly, 
transparent, system-wide basis; and 
7. More effectively address some administrative issues, including management of bail 
services and budget formulation. 
8. Understanding that the budget is likely to be approximately $2.8 million short for FY 
2014 given certain assumptions. This Legislation should address that shortfall and 
ensure a realistic amount for FY 201551 and begin funding the sinking fund for future 
capital consideration by a supplemental appropriation bill for consideration at the 2nd 
session of the 126th Legislature. 
 
 
 
                                                
50 “Government implies the power to make laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, it be attended with a 
sanction. In other words, a penalty for disobedience. If there are no penalties annexed to disobedience, 
the resolution...which pretends to be law will in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or 
recommendations.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 15 
51 See Appendix K 
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We hope this combination of measures will give the BOC energy, decisiveness and 
accountability to the Legislature. 
 
It is the best way we know to preserve the operational authority of the old system, while 
achieving the Statewide fairness and efficiency current circumstances demand. 
 
But in the end, we must replace the current unworkable confederacy with a truly unified 
system. 
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Appendix B: Task Force Agendas
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
9/20/13 - MEETING ONE
1.      Welcome and Introductions - Chair Flanagan
2.      Review of Authorizing Legislation - Chair Flanagan
3.      How We Got Here - Bob Devlin
4.      Report on Financial Status of BOC - Scott Ferguson
5.      Identify Issues Need to be Addressed - Chair Flanagan
6.      Formulation of Statement of Problems & Identification of Objectives - Chair Flanagan
           (based on survey distributed)
7.      What Documents will be Needed
8.      Other Stakeholders to Include
9.       Ground Rules for Committee
10.     Meeting Schedule and Topics
11.     Other
12.     Adjourn
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
10/4/13 - MEETING TWO
The Commission will hold a public hearing beginning at nine AM, until not later than 11 AM
Friday, October 4 in room 301A, also known as the Board of Corrections Board Room of the
Marquardt Building in Augusta. The public is invited to testify with respect to revisions to the
statutes relating to the County Jail System, the Board of Corrections and the state unified
system. 16 copies of testimony are requested the morning of the hearing. Time will be allocated
equitably to assure all parties have an opportunity to be heard. Following the hearing, the
Commission will continue the meeting to discuss sub- committee progress to date and review
hearing presentations. All are welcome.
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
10/25/13 - MEETING THREE
1. Call to Order
2. Approval of Minutes from October 4 meeting
3. Presentation of Committee Reports
4. Discussion of Reports
5. Next Steps
6. Adjourn
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AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
11/01/13 - MEETING FOUR
1.  Call to Order
2.  Introductions & Review of Meeting Expectations (Chair)
3.  Review of Options
a.     Return to County Control and Responsibility (Chair)
b.     Adopt a State Unified System (Whitten)
c.     Amend BOC/Create Regional Authorities (Crichton)
d.     Amend BOC/ Increased County Role & Responsibility (Baldacci)
4.  Comments of Rod Miller re BJA Report (Miller via phone)
5.  Discussion of pros and cons of options presented
6.  Straw vote on principles to incorporate in legislation
7.  Discussion of outline of the Commission Report
8.  Discussion of next steps and timetable
9.  Adjourn
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
11/15/13 - MEETING FIVE
1.  Call to Order
2.  Welcome and Introductions
3.  Approval of Minutes from October 4 meeting
4.  Brief Analysis of Member Survey
5.  Concepts in the Report
6.  Discussions
7.  Straw Draft of Proposed Legislation
8.  Adjourn
AGENDA- JAIL TASK FORCE
12/6/13 - MEETING SIX
1. Call to Order
2. Welcome and Introductions
3. Approval of Minutes from November 15 meeting
4. Discussion of Draft Report
5. Approve Proposed Solutions
6. Adjourn
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Appendix D “Maine State Caseload 5­year Trends”
http://www.courts.state.me.us/reports_pubs/reports/5yr%20Court%20Stats%20for%20Internet/All%20Courts%20C
aseload%20FY'09_FY'13.pdf
Appendix E: BOC Membership, November 2013
Carleton Barnes,
Jr. Manager
Wesserunsett
Consulting, LLC Calais
Douglas Beaulieu
County
Administrator Aroostook County Caribou
Randall Liberty Sheriff Kennebec County Augusta
Amy Fowler
County
Commissioner Waldo County Palermo
Mary Louise
McEwen Superintendent
Riverview
Psychiatric Center Augusta
Susan Morisette Consultant Winslow
Joseph Ponte Commissioner
Maine Department
of Corrections Augusta
Stuart Smith Selectman Town of Edgecomb Edgecomb
Mark Westrum,
chair
Correctional
Administrator
Two Bridges
Regional Jail Wiscasset
Vacant Executive Director
State Board of
Corrections Augusta
Jane Tower
Executive
Associate
Maine Department
of Corrections Augusta
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Appendix F: Proposed Capital Projects in 2007­2008
Appendix G: Board of Corrections Purpose, Goals & Guiding Principles
PURPOSE AND GOALS
1. Purpose of the board. The purpose of the board is to develop and implement a unified
correctional system that demonstrates sound fiscal management, achieves efficiencies,
reduces recidivism and ensures the safety and security of correctional staff, inmates,
visitors, volunteers and surrounding communities.
2. State goals. The board shall develop goals to guide the development of and evaluate the
effectiveness of a unified correctional system. The board shall present its goals for
review and approval by the joint standing committee of the Legislature having jurisdiction
over criminal justice and public safety matters. The goals must include benchmarks for
performance in the following areas:
○ Recidivism reduction;
○ Pretrial diversion; and
○ Rate of incarceration.
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Responsibilities and duties
1. Manage the cost of corrections.
2. Determine correctional facility use and purpose.
3. Adopt treatment standards and policies.
4. Certificate of need.
5. Administrative duties.
6. Receive and review recommendations.
Downloaded from http://www.maine.gov/corrections/BOC/purpose.htm on 9/22/13
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A Unified State and County Corrections System that:
• Reduces risk through the use of the Evidence Based Practices and encourages sentencing in
accordance with risk;
• Creates an integrated, regional system build on the strengths of the existing state and county
facilities and services and is based on differentiated missions;
• Is a stewardship approach that manages and maintains the existing assets and resources for
the maximum benefit and invests strategically to accomplish system goals;
• Allows innovation, but is collaboratively based and recognizes that decisions about change and
its management are shared;
• Creates incentives for us all to work together and promotes cohesion;
• Is consistent with the compromise enacted in Public Law 653;
• Incorporates the recommendations of the Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee and the
two plans developed by the state and the counties;
• Meets the system’s needs for risk management and security housing;
• Works in concert with other policy makers including the Legislature, the Judiciary and the
Sentencing Council, and;
• Involves and includes local stakeholders including prosecutors, local law enforcement, and
others.
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Appendix H: Jail Costs Per Capita by County
Alex Kimball 2013
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What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?
100%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N
y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment?  Y or N
n
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment?  Y or N
n
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N
n
Revenues Full Year Amount Remaining
Starting cash balance n/a 4,098,340$                    
Investment Fund Revenues 6,536,295$              -$                                     
CCA 5,646,562$              -$                                     
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's 786,259$                 525,950$                        
Major Mission Change 1,029,751$              1,029,751$                    
Franklin Mission Change 180,248$                        
Prior Year Carryforward 328,600$                 -$                                     
Total Revenues 14,327,467$            5,834,289$                    
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments 12,886,356$            7,367,263$                    
Somerset 2nd half 2013 -$                                     
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA) -$                                     
CCA 5,398,112$              1,129,312$                    
Board & Personnel 164,032$                 186,291$                        
Total Expenses 18,448,500$            8,682,866$                    
Net Deficit (4,121,033)$     (2,848,577)$          
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What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?
80%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N
y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment?  Y or N
n
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment?  Y or N
n
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N
n
Revenues Full Year Amount Remaining
Starting cash balance n/a 4,098,340$                    
Investment Fund Revenues 6,536,295$              -$                                     
CCA 5,646,562$              -$                                     
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's 786,259$                 525,950$                        
Major Mission Change 1,029,751$              1,029,751$                    
Franklin Mission Change 180,248$                        
Prior Year Carryforward 328,600$                 -$                                     
Total Revenues 14,327,467$            5,834,289$                    
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments 12,886,356$            5,893,810$                    
Somerset 2nd half 2013 -$                                     
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA) -$                                     
CCA 5,398,112$              1,129,312$                    
Board & Personnel 164,032$                 186,291$                        
Total Expenses 18,448,500$            7,209,413$                    
Net Deficit (4,121,033)$     (1,375,124)$          
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What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?
100%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N
y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment?  Y or N
y
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment?  Y or N
y
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N
n
Revenues Full Year Amount Remaining
Starting cash balance n/a 4,098,340$                    
Investment Fund Revenues 6,536,295$              -$                                     
CCA 5,646,562$              -$                                     
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's 786,259$                 525,950$                        
Major Mission Change 1,029,751$              1,029,751$                    
Franklin Mission Change 180,248$                        
Prior Year Carryforward 328,600$                 -$                                     
Total Revenues 14,327,467$            5,834,289$                    
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments 12,886,356$            7,367,263$                    
Somerset 2nd half 2013 560,884$                        
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA) 1,370,216$                    
CCA 5,398,112$              1,129,312$                    
Board & Personnel 164,032$                 186,291$                        
Total Expenses 18,448,500$            10,613,966$                  
Net Deficit (4,121,033)$     (4,779,677)$          
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Funds and Purpose
Overview of Jail funding Sources
Type of Fund Source Purpose Amount
Community Corrections State Allocation Community Corrections 5,646,562.00$                  
Programs
Inverse Debt None Capital Needs -$                                    
Investment Fund State Allocation Jail Operating Expenses 12,886,355.00$                
Federal Inmates US Marshalls Reimbursement for housing 3,630,601.00$                  
federal inmates
County Property Taxes Jail Operating Expenses 61,808,927.00$                
Other Misc Mostly reimbursements for 196,934.00$                      
inmates from other agencies
Total Revenues 84,169,379.00$                
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FY 15 Deficit Calculator
What percent of IF payments will the counties need?
100%
Does Somerset receive FY 15 IF Payments? (Y or N)
y
What is the Statewide average LD 1 Cap?
3.6%
What is the most recent 1-Year CPI?
1.0%
Revenues FY 14 Projected FY 15 Budgets FY 15 LD 1 Max FY 15 CPI
Investment Fund Revenues 6,536,295$              6,536,295$                6,536,295$                6,536,295$                  
CCA 5,646,562$              5,646,562$                5,646,562$                5,646,562$                  
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's 786,259$                  786,259$                   786,259$                   786,259$                     
Major Mission Change 1,029,751$              1,029,751$                1,029,751$                1,029,751$                  
Franklin Mission Change 678,026$                  678,026$                   678,026$                   678,026$                     
Prior Year Carryforward 328,600$                  -$                                 -$                                 -$                                  
Total Revenues 15,005,493$            14,676,893$              14,676,893$              14,676,893$               
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments 11,764,589$            15,523,759$              14,325,366$              12,475,915$               
Somerset County Payments 1,121,767$                1,365,033$                1,189,341$                  
CCA 5,398,112$              5,398,112$                5,398,112$                5,398,112$                  
Board & Personnel 164,032$                  200,000$                   200,000$                   200,000$                     
Total Expenses 17,326,733$            22,243,638$              21,288,511$              19,263,368$               
Net Deficit (2,321,240)$     (7,566,745)$       (6,611,618)$       (4,586,475)$        
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